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Text 4: Porphryry, Commentary on the Timaeus fr. 36-37 Sodano = Philoponus, aet. mundi VI, 8, p. 148, 7-15 Rabe

And Porphyry adds other senses of ‘generated’ to those enumerated by Taurus. He says (10) that a thing which is described as [subject to] generation is said to be generated even though it has never actually come to be ; examples are words and syllables, because they can be analysed into letters and are composed of letters, and diagrams, [among which] rectilinear figures, for example, are notionally divided into triangles and (15) constructed out of triangles. It is, I presume, clear that this amounts to the same thing as being composed of matter and form, for things that are generated in the sense that they are not simple but composed of matter and form are said to be generated on the same basis as diagrams are [said to be] : because things simpler than either, out of which (20) their composition and into which their dissolution notionally take place, are conceived of as having prior existence, they are, in contrast to things that are simple from every point of view and carry with them no notion of composition, referred to as generated. Therefore these two senses should be regarded as one. And perhaps this is why (25) the other of [our two] commentators [sc. Taurus] has not even mentioned this sense.

Fr. 2, 36 Sodano

In addition, Porphyry says that things that derive their existence (p. 141, 1) from [a process of] generation and coming to be, for example a house or a ship or a plant or an animal, are also said to be generated. For this reason we do not describe a flash of lightning or a snapping of the fingers or anything else that exists and ceases to exist in an instant as generated : as Aristotle (5) also says, all such things come to be without a [process of] generation and switch to non-existence without [a process of] decay. It is clear that nobody would hold that the world is generated in the sense of having to come to be through a process of generation, for God brought all things into substantification (10) simultaneously with thought. This being so, we shall have no need of this sense [of ‘generated’] in our investigation of Plato's meaning.

Finally, Porphyry says [that things which are called generated in the] familiar, everyday sense, things that have had a beginning from a [point of] time without previously having existed, a sense in which he claims Plato did not describe the world as generated, are said (15) to be generated.

καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ταύρου κατηριθμημένοις καὶ ἕτερα προστί­θησιν τοῦ γενητοῦ σημαινόμενα· φησὶν γὰρ (10) γενητὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον γενέσεως, κἂν μηδέποτε γεγονὸς ᾖ, ὡς τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ αἱ συλλαβαὶ τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς στοιχεῖα καὶ συντίθεσθαι ἐκ στοιχείων καὶ ὡς τὰ διαγράμματα οἷον τὰ εὐθύγραμμα τῶν σχημάτων εἰς τρίγωνά τε διαιρεῖται τῷ λόγῳ καὶ (15) ἐκ τριγώνων σύγκειται. δῆλον δήπου, ὅτι εἰς ταὐτὸν συντρέχει τοῦτο τῷ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους συνθέτῳ· τὸ γὰρ οὕτω γενητὸν ὡς οὐκ ὂν ἁπλοῦν ἀλλὰ συγκεί­μενον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τοῖς διαγράμμασιν γενητὸν λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ προεπινοεῖσθαι (20) ἀμφοτέρων τινὰ ἁπλούστερα, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύν­θεσις αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται καὶ εἰς ἃ ἡ ἀνάλυσις, ταύτῃ γενητὰ λέγεται πρὸς ἀντέμφασιν τῶν πάντῃ ἁπλῶν καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐπίνοιαν ἐχόντων συνθέσεως. ὥστε ὡς ἓν ἄμφω ληπτέον. καὶ ταύτῃ ἴσως οὐδὲ μνήμην τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου ὁ (25) ἕτερος τῶν ὑπομνη­ματιστῶν πεποίηται.
ἔτι φησὶν ὁ Πορφύριος γενητὸν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ διὰ γενέσεως καὶ (p. 141, 1) τοῦ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι λαβόν, ὡς οἰκία καὶ πλοῖον καὶ φυτὸν καὶ ζῷον, καθ τν στραπν κα τν κρότον κα σα ξαίφνης φίσταται κα παύεται ο λέγομεν εναι γενητά· πάντα γρ τ τοιατα, ς κα ριστο- (5) τέλης φησίν, νευ γενέσεως ες τ εναι παραγίγνεται καὶ χωρὶς φθορᾶς εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι μεταβάλλει·
καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν κατὰ τοῦτο γενητὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ὑπόθοιτο ὡς διὰ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγενόμενον· μα γρ νοήματι ες οσίωσιν θες τ(10) πάντα παρήγαγεν. ὥστε οὐδὲν τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου εἰς ἐξέτασιν τῆς Πλάτωνος διανοίας δεησόμεθα.
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν γενητὸν λέγεσθαί φησιν ὁ Πορφύριος καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν γνώριμόν τε καὶ καθωμιλημένον τὸ ἀπὸ χρόνου ἀρχὴν τοῦ εἶναι λαβὸν πρότερον οὐκ ὄν, καθό φησιν μὴ λέγεσθαι ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος γενητὸν τὸν κό- (15) σμον.

Text 5: Aristotle, Physics 8, 1, 250b12-252b8, translation R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye

(10) Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being, and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion ? Or are we to say that it never had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be ? Is it in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally (15) constituted things? (...)

Let us take our start from what we have already laid down in our course on Physics. Motion, we say, is the actuality of the movable in so far as it is movable. Each kind of motion, (251a10) therefore, necessarily presupposes the existence of the things that are capable of that motion. In fact, even apart from the definition of motion, every one would admit that in each kind of motion it is what is capable of that motion that is in motion : thus it is what is capable of alteration that is altered, and what is capable of local change that is in locomotion. Thus, there must be something capable of being burned (15) before there can be a process of being burned, and something capable of burning before there can be a process of burning. Moreover, these things also must either have a beginning before which they had no being, or they must be eternal. Now if there was a becoming of every movable thing, it follows that before the motion in question another change or motion must have taken place in which (20) what was capable of being moved or of causing motion had its becoming. To suppose, on the other hand, that these things were in being throughout all previous time without there being any motion appears unreasonable on a moment's thought, and still more unreasonable, we shall find, on further consideration. For if we are to say that, while there are on the one hand things that are movable, and on the other hand things that are mobile, there is a time when there is a first movent and a first (25) moved, and another time when there is no such thing but only something that is at rest, then this thing that is at rest must previously have been in process of change, for there must have been some cause of its rest, rest being the privation of motion. Therefore, before this first change there will be a previous change (...)

(251b10) Further, how can there be any ‘before’ and ‘after’ without the existence of time ? Or how can there be any time without the existence of motion ? If, then, time is the number of motion or itself a kind of motion, it follows that, if there is always time, motion must also be eternal. But so far as time is concerned we see that all with one exception (15) are in agreement in saying that it is ungenerated (...) Plato alone asserts the generation of time, saying that it had a becoming together with the universe, the universe according to him having had a becoming (...)

Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our contention that there never was a time (252b5) when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion.

Θ (10) Πότερον γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις οὐκ οὖσα πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν, ἢ οὔτ’ ἐγένετο οὔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει (15) συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν (...)
       ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν διωρισ­μένων ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πρότερον. φαμν δ τν κίνησιν εναι νέργειαν89 το κινητο κινητόν. ναγκαον ρα πάρχειν τ (10) πράγματα τ δυνάμενα κινεσθαι καθ’ κάστην κίνησιν. κα χωρς δ το τῆς κινήσεως ὁρισμοῦ, πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κινεῖσθαι τὸ δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι καθ’ ἑκάστην κίνησιν, οἷον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι μὲν τὸ ἀλλοιωτόν, φέρεσθαι δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον μεταβλητόν, ὥστε δεῖ πρότερον καυστὸν εἶναι (15) πρὶν καίεσθαι καὶ καυστικὸν πρὶν κάειν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἢ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐκ ὄντα ἢ ἀΐδια εἶναι. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐγένετο τῶν κινητῶν ἕκαστον, ἀναγκαῖον πρότερον τῆς ληφθείσης ἄλλην γενέσθαι μεταβολὴν καὶ κίνησιν, καθ’ ἣν (20) ἐγένετο τὸ δυνατὸν κινηθῆναι ἢ κινῆσαι· εἰ δ’ ὄντα προϋπῆρχεν ἀεὶ κινήσεως μὴ οὔσης, ἄλογον μὲν φαίνεται καὶ αὐτόθεν ἐπιστήσασιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔτι προάγουσι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. μᾶλλον ἔτι προάγουσι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν κινητῶν ὄντων τῶν δὲ κινητικῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ἔσται τι πρῶτον κινοῦν, τὸ δὲ κινούμε (25) νον, ὁτὲ δ’ οὐθέν, ἀλλ’ ἠρεμεῖ, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν πρότερον· ἦν γάρ τι αἴτιον τῆς ἠρεμίας· ἡ γὰρ ἠρέμησις στέρησις κινήσεως. ὥστε πρὸ τῆς πρώτης μεταβολῆς ἔσται μεταβολὴ προτέρα (...)

(251b10) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον πῶς ἔσται χρόνου μὴ ὄντος; ἢ χρό­νος μὴ οὔσης κινήσεως; εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος κινήσεως ἀριθμὸς ἢ κίνησίς τις, εἴπερ ἀεὶ χρόνος ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν περί γε χρόνου ἔξω ἑνὸς ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχοντες (15) φαίνονται πάντες· ἀγένητον γὰρ εἶναι λέγουσιν (...) Πλάτων δὲ γεννᾷ μόνος· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν τῷ οὐρανῷ [γεγονέναι], τὸν δ’ οὐρανὸν γεγονέναι φησίν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν καὶ εἶναι

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς ἦν χρόνος οὐδ’ ἔσται ὅτε κίνη- (5) σις οὐκ ἦν ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

Text 6: Simplicius, In Phys., 1154, 3-20 Diel, transl. M. Chase

It is now necessary to state what I have often said elsewhere, viz. that since ‘generated’ and ‘ungenerated’ have many meanings, and Plato and (5) Aristotle use them in different senses, they seem to be contrary to one another, although they are not really opposed. After all, ‘generated’ means what earlier does not exist, but later exists, and what has its subsistence in a part of time, and this is the meaning in which Aristotle uses ‘generated’, which he opposes to ‘everlasting’ in his division. Another meaning of ‘generated’ is the one that is opposed in divisions to true being, which is eternal and (10) self-subsistent90: it is what has its being in becoming and comes into existence from another cause, not by itself. And ‘generated’ is said by means of both of these, viz. by the opposition to what is truly existent and simultaneously whole, and the opposition to what is self-subsistent, even if it is everlasting. And it is according to this meaning that Plato calls the entire sensible and corporeal structure ‘generated’, for (15) all that is corporeal is dispersed, and can neither give existence to itself, nor be brought together into a simultaneous whole, neither with regard to substance, nor to the being of substance. He clearly opposes at the outset what is generated to what exists, where he says91: ‘What is that which always exists, having no coming into being, and what is that which is always becoming, but is never existent?’. It is, then, in accordance with this ‘generated’, not the one stated by Aristotle, (20) that Plato says both the world and time are generated.

Τὰ πολλάκις ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρημένα πρὸς ἐμοῦ καὶ νῦν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι πολλαχῶς τοῦ γενητοῦ καὶ ἀγενήτου λεγομένων ἄλλως μὲν ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλως δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης αὐτῷ χρώμενοι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς ἀλλή- (5) λους οὐκ ἐναντιούμενοι. καὶ γὰρ γενητὸν λέγεται τὸ πρότερον μὲν μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν, καὶ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον, καθ’ ὃ σημαινόμενον Ἀριστοτέλης χρῆται τῷ γενητῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον ἀντιδιαιρῶν αὐτό. ἄλλο δὲ τοῦ γενητοῦ σημαινόμενον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὂν τὸ αἰώνιον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον ἀντιδιῃρημένον, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχον ἀπ’ (10) αἰτίας ἄλλης ὑφίσταται καὶ οὐχ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ. καὶ δι’ ἄμφω ταῦτα διά τε τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ ἅμα ὅλον ὂν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀντίθεσιν γενητὸν λέγεται, κἂν ἀίδιον ᾖ. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον ὁ Πλάτων πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθη­τὴν καὶ σωματικὴν σύστασιν γενητὴν καλεῖ· τὸ γὰρ σωματικὸν πᾶν διεσπασμένον οὔτε αὐτὸ ὑφιστάνειν ἑαυτὸ δύναται οὔτε (15) ἅμα ὅλον συνῆχθαι οὔτε κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας· καὶ δῆλός ἐστιν εὐθὺς τῷ ὄντι τὸ γενητὸν ἀντιτιθείς, ἐν οἷς φησι· “τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε.” κατὰ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ γενητὸν καὶ οὐχὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους λεγόμενον (20) καὶ τὸν κόσμον γενητὸν ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ καὶ τὸν χρόνον.

Text 7: Aristotle, Physics, 3, 1, 201a9-202a3

We have now before us the distinctions in the various classes of being between what is in actuality and what is potential. The actuality of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is motion — namely, of what is alterable qua alterable, alteration ; of what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased (there is no common name), increase and decrease ; of what can come to be and can pass away, coming to be and passing away ; of what can be transported, locomotion (...)

Hence we can define motion as the actualization of the movable qua movable…

διῃρημένου δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, το δυνάμει ντος ντελέχεια, τοιοτον, κίνησίς στιν, οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾗ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοίωσις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ ξησις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά (...)

διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν…

Text 8a: Aristotle, Physics 3, 1, 201b27-202a3

The reason in turn why motion is thought to be indefinite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality. A thing that is merely capable of having a certain size is not undergoing change, nor yet (30) a thing that is actually of a certain size, and motion is thought to be a sort of actuality, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the potential thing whose actuality it is is incomplete. This is why it is hard to grasp what motion is. It is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with sheer actuality, yet none of these seems possible. There remains then (202a1) the suggested mode of definition, namely that it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing.

τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστιν θεῖναι αὐτήν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν ποσὸν εἶναι κινεῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε τὸ ἐν- (30) εργείᾳ ποσόν, τε κίνησις νέργεια μν εναί τις δοκε, τελς δέ· αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατόν, οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι ἢ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἁπλῆν, τούτων δ’ οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον.
λείπεται (202a.) τοίνυν ὁ εἰρημένος τρόπος, ἐνέργειαν μέν τινα εἶναι, τοιαύτην δ’ ἐνέργειαν οἵαν εἴπαμεν, χαλεπὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, ἐνδεχομένην δ’ εἶναι.

Text 8b: Aristotle, Metaph. Θ 6, 1048b18-36, translation D. Ross

Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the losing weight, or slimming-down, and the bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already (20) that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end) ; but that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured). At the same time we are living well and have lived well, (25) and are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases : but, as things are, it does not cease ; we are living and have lived.

Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete : making thin, learning, walking, building ; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time (30) a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν ἢ ἰσχνασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ (20) ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις, οκ στι τατα πρξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος)· λλ’ κείνη <> νυπάρχει τ τέλος κα [] πρξις. οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑώρακε,> καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ’ ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται·

ε ζ κα ε ζηκεν μα, (25) κα εδαιμονε κα εδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δ’ οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν.

τούτων δ <δε> τς μν κινήσεις λέγειν, τς δ’ νεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα (30) βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ’ οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τν μν ον τοιαύτην νέργειαν λέγω, κείνην δ κίνησιν.

Text 8c: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10, 4, 1174a13 ff., trans. Ross

Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being later (15) will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, it is not a motion. For every motion (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made (20) what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all motions are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole motion and from each other (...) They differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time (...) it seems that is not complete at any and every time, but that the many motions are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form (1174b5) is complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased ; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.

From these considerations it is clear, too, that these thinkers are not right in saying that pleasure is a motion or a coming into being. For these (10) cannot be ascribed to all things, but only to those that are divisible and not wholes ; there is no coming into being of seeing nor of a point nor of a unit, nor is any of these a motion or coming into being; therefore there is no motion or coming into being of pleasure either ; for it is a whole.

δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ’ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον (15) γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ’ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατ’ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. ν χρόν γρ πσα κίνησις κα τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ (20) οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.
(...) τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι (...) ἔοικε δ’ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν.
τς δονς δ’ ν τον (5) χρόν τέλειον τ εδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ’ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή.

δόξειε δ’ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ κ το μ νδέχεσθαι κινεσθαι μ ν χρόν, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι.

ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ (10) γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οδ γρ ράσεώς στι γένεσις οδ στιγμς οδ μονάδος, οδ τούτων οθν κίνησις οδ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.

Каталог: classics -> schole
schole -> И классическая традиция Том выпуск 2014 Традиция платонизма
schole -> И классическая традиция Том выпуск 2012 ΣΧΟΛΗ
schole -> 2009 ΣΧΟΛΗ Философское антиковедение и классическая традиция
schole -> И классическая традиция Том выпуск 2012 ΣΧΟΛΗ
schole -> 2009 ΣΧΟΛΗ Философское антиковедение и классическая традиция
schole -> ΣΧΟΛΗ Философское антиковедение и классическая традиция
schole -> S c o L h философское антиковедение и классическая традиция Том I выпуск 1

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